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Summary 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been criticised
for its restrictive application of article 59 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights resulting, it is argued, in a shroud of secrecy around
the protective elements of its work. This article explores the application of
the principles and presumptions in article 59 and the confidentiality
covering the communication procedure of the African Commission after
the adoption of the decision. Research reveals that there may be a greater
likelihood of implementation of the recommendations in the decision if it is
visible and a variety of actors are made aware of its existence and these
measures that the state then takes, or fails to take. Drawing upon an
Economic and Social Research Council-funded project, the article argues
that article 59 in practice has so far been applied without a great deal of
thought, to procedures post-decision that monitor the implementation of
the recommendations. Thus, at present the African Commission has
slipped into presuming that measures taken by the state to implement
recommendations, evidence presented by the complainants (or indeed
other actors) on the extent to which it has done so, and the Commission’s
own assessment, fall within the communication procedure and, therefore,
by default are confidential. Yet, article 59 does not require this, neither do
the Rules of Procedure, and a blanket approach to confidentiality post-
decision is not appropriate. The article recommends that the African
Commission can improve publication and visibility of the decision itself;
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
* LLB (Leicester) LLM (Bristol) PhD (W England); Rachel.Murray@bristol.ac.uk. I
would like to thank Frans Viljoen, Debra Long and Clara Sandoval-Villalba for their
helpful and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
 To cite: R Murray ‘Confidentiality and the implementation of the decisions of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2019) 19 African Human Rights Law Journal 1-25
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2019/v19n1a1
2                                                             (2019) 19 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
and should be making available on its website and in documentation
information on what measures the state has taken to implement the
decision.
Key words: Africa; human rights; confidentiality; implementation;
article 59
1 Introduction 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) has been criticised for its restrictive application of article
59 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Charter) resulting, it is argued, in a shroud of secrecy around the
protective elements of its work.1 This article explores the application
of the principles and presumptions in article 59 and the confidentiality
covering the communication procedure of the African Commission
after the adoption of the decision. Research reveals that there may be
a greater likelihood of implementation of the recommendations in the
decision if it is visible and a variety of actors are made aware of its
existence and the measures to implement it that the state then takes
or fails to take.2 Drawing upon an Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC)-funded project,3 I argue that article 59 in practice has
so far been applied, without a great deal of thought to procedures
post-decision that monitor the implementation of the recommen-
dations.
Since its establishment in 1987 the African Commission has
received more than 500 communications under article 55 of the
African Charter whereby individuals, civil society organisations (CSOs)
and others have submitted cases that allege violations of the rights in
the Charter. If admissible, the African Commission then will proceed
to look at the merits and, if violations are found, will make
‘recommendations’ to the state on what action it should take to
1 See eg M Killander ‘Confidentiality versus publicity: Interpreting article 59 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law
Journal 574-575.
2 See eg Open Society Justice Initiative From rights to remedies: Structures and
strategies for implementing international human rights decisions (2013).
3 See Human Rights Implementation Project (Project), http://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/
hrlip/ (accessed 1 April 2019). This project tracked the implementation of
decisions from nine states: three in Africa (Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Zambia);
three in Europe (Belgium, the Czech Republic and Georgia) and three in the
Americas (Canada, Colombia and Guatemala), adopted by UN treaty bodies and
the regional human rights commissions and courts. It consisted of documentary
analyses, in-country workshops, and over 200 interviews with members and
representatives of these supranational bodies, and within the nine states, the
government representatives, victims, parliamentarians, the judiciary, civil society
organisations and academics. Interviews are anonymous. However, where
appropriate, information is given on the profile or location of the interviewee. For
further information on our methodology, see Journal of Human Rights Practice,
Special Issue, 2019, forthcoming.
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remedy those violations. This latter section is found at the end of the
decision. These recommendations have varied in number, breadth,
detail and sophistication, from a bland ‘take measures to comply with
its international obligations’, to lists of tasks that the state should carry
out, such as establishing commissions of inquiry, releasing the
individuals, paying compensation and amending legislation.4 While
the content may still be criticised for their ambiguity, the trend is to
become increasingly detailed and focused in setting out what the
state should do once violations have been found. Normally the state
will be given 180 days to respond to the Commission on the measures
it has taken to implement the recommendations.5 However, often
little is known about whether states in fact implement these
recommendations. Systematic follow-up by the African Commission
has not yet occurred although ad hoc information is available.6 Some
of this information is public (for example in its annual reports, or
through statements by CSOs), some of it is private, but there does not
appear to be a consistent approach or policy on which aspects, if any,
should be confidential.
The decision on the communication, including the
recommendations that the state should take to address the violations,
used to be published in the Commission’s Activity Report, but since
the African Union (AU) organs restricted the number of pages in
2011,7 the text of the communication now appears under the
relevant page on the website.
Article 59 of the African Charter provides:
1 All measures taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall
remain confidential until the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government shall otherwise decide.
2 However, the report shall be published by the Chairman of the
Commission upon the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government.
3 The report on the activities of the Commission shall be published by
its Chairman after it has been considered by the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government.
Thus, prior to this approval by the Assembly the decision remains
confidential. While the focus of discussion around article 59 principally
has been on when decisions and information on them should be
4 See eg G Bekker ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and
remedies for human rights violations’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 499;
R Murray The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A commentary (2019)
ch 2.
5 Rule 112(2), Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, 2010.
6 Eg in its annual reports and in an oral report by the Chairperson of the Working
Group on Communications to each ordinary session of the African Commission;
see further below.
7 30th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
2011.
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published, no debate has taken place on what happens post-adoption
of the decision by the African Commission and the AU. One might
consider this lack to be irrelevant: Article 59 applies only to the
decision pre-authorisation by the AU organs. However, the policy of
confidentiality applicable to its communication procedure risks being
applied, by default, to the processes that occur post-decision. Leaving
aside cogent criticisms directed at the manner in which article 59 has
been employed by the African Commission pre-decision (particularly
given interference by the AU political organs in the content of the
Commission’s findings),8 this restrictive approach does not need to
and, indeed, should not automatically apply to any process post-
adoption of the decision.
There are various points post-decision to which confidentiality may
apply, as will be seen below, including information provided by the
state on the measures it has taken to implement the decision or
judgment; information provided by other actors, including the victims
or complainants, on what the state has done, if anything; and the
assessment the African Commission may make as to whether those
measures are sufficient. These points will be examined in turn.
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court)
does not operate under the constraints of article 59. However, given
the nascent processes and the potential fluidity of any monitoring
mechanism by the African Commission as well as the relationship of
both organs with the AU political bodies, this article will draw as well
upon the approach of the African Court.
2 Confidential from whom
The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘confidential’ as ‘intended to be
kept secret’, but neither article 59 nor the Rules of Procedure of the
African Commission assist in clarifying confidential in relation to
whom. Whilst submissions and pleadings during the consideration of
a communication are shared by the Commission with the parties to
the case, the actual decision on the merits is only provided to the
parties after it has been approved by the Assembly of the AU. Thus,
‘confidential’ in the context of article 59 means different things at
different stages of the process: While the case is pending, documents
should not be disseminated beyond the parties and Commission, but
once the decision has been adopted by the Commission it is not
disclosed even to the parties until it has been approved by the
Assembly. 
The focus of the article is about what happens subsequently,
whether the measures taken by the state to implement the decision or
judgment are then made public, that is, visible to the parties to the
8 Eg Decision on the 17th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Assembly/AU/Dec.49(III); Killander (n 1) 574-575.
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case and the African Commission and beyond, to other stakeholders
and the public. At the very least, one would expect the victims to
know what action the state has taken in response to the decision,
particularly individual measures. The victims themselves have a right
to know what the state is doing to redress the violations that
occurred. One could argue that this has already been achieved if the
state has reported its activities to the victims directly or to them
through the treaty or monitoring body. Yet, while the state authorities
may engage the victim with respect to any individual measures (such
as payment of compensation), the project also obtained evidence in
at least one case, that the victim did not know whether other
reparations such as guarantees of non-repetition had been
implemented.9
Consequently, throughout the article I talk of confidentiality in
terms of information being made public, beyond the parties to the
communication and the treaty body itself.
3 Other regional systems and the United Nations
Comparisons with other regional systems reveal a mixed picture.
Under the Council of Europe, as noted below, discussions on what
measures the state will take to implement the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights take place in private and without
the victim’s presence. However, these measures, including their action
plans, subsequently are published by the Committee of Ministers,
along with submissions from the parties as well as non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and national human rights institutions.10 When
the Committee decides no longer to supervise implementation it will
adopt a resolution. All of these documents are available on-line.11 The
Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights also adopts reports on the implementation of judgments.12
9 Interview A.7, December 2017.
10 Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of judgments and of the
terms of friendly settlements (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 May
2006 at its 964th session), Appendix 4, item 4.4, Doc CMRules (2006) App 4,
Rules 8.2-8.5.
11 See https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.
asp; http://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/submissions; http://www.coe.int/en/
web/execution/closed-cases (accessed 1 April 2019); also through HUDOC.
12 See eg Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Implementation of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Report (Rapporteur: Mr Klaas
de Vries, The Netherlands, Socialist Group), Doc 13864, 9 September 2015, http:/
/assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=22005&lang=EN
(accessed 1 April 2019). The report forms the basis on which the Parliamentary
Assembly adopted Resolution 2075 (2015), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=22197&lang=EN and Recommendation 2079
(2015), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=2219
8&lang=EN (accessed 1 April 2019).
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With respect to cases before the Inter-American Commission for
those states that have not accepted the Inter-American Court’s
jurisdiction the process is confidential. The Commission will consider
whether the state has taken adequate measures to comply with its
recommendations and, if it has failed to do so, after a vote of an
absolute majority of the Commission’s members the report on the
merits will become public, although in practice all the specific
documents submitted by the parties will not.13 Where the state has
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, if the Commission considers that the
state has complied with its recommendations, it can choose whether
to publish the report on the merits.14 The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights includes sections in its annual reports that set out
the action that states have taken and the current state of
implementation, separating out friendly settlements from
recommendations.15 The Commission also could host private working
meetings on compliance or thematic hearings (that are not based on
a single case) to look at compliance issues.
After the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has issued a
judgment it establishes modalities of compliance to be followed by
the state that include, for example, when to report to the Court.
When the Court receives the state’s report it is shared with the legal
representatives of the victims for their comments. The report is then
sent to the Commission for it also to comment. This entire process is
confidential. The Court also can hold private or public hearings to
learn more about compliance, but the greatest majority of hearings
have been of a private nature.
All the UN treaty bodies consider communications in closed
sessions so that the oral deliberations and summary records remain
confidential.16 Once views on the communication have been
formulated it is standard practice for these to be sent to the individual
and the state party concerned.17 The text of any final decision on the
merits of the case or of a decision of inadmissibility is posted on the
website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) as part of the treaty bodies’ jurisprudence. The UN treaty
bodies also include information on follow-up in their annual reports to
13 Art 51(3).
14 IACHR Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure Doc OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 45/13,
18 December 2013 para 62, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/friendly_settlements/
docs/ReportFriendlySettlement.pdf (accessed 1 April 2019).
15 See IACHR, Annual Report 2015, ch II.D, Status of compliance with the
recommendations of the IACHR.
16 Eg Human Rights Committee: see art 5(3) of the Optional Protocol to ICCPR and
Rule 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure. See also Guidelines on Making Oral
Comments Concerning Communications, CCPR/C/159, 21 December 2017 para
3(e).
17 See art 5 of the Optional Protocol to ICCPR, and Rule 101 of the Rules of
Procedure of the HRC; Rule 107 of the Rules of Procedure for the CAT; Rule 76 for
the Rules of Procedure for CRPD; Rule 29 for the Rules of Procedure for CRC; Rule
74 of the Rules of Procedure for CEDAW; Rule 80 for the Rules of Procedure of
CED; and Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure of ICESCR.
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the General Assembly18 or, in the case of the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in the follow-up reports. However, it can be
difficult to find specific information on the activities of the Special
Rapporteurs on follow-up, whose reports to the respective
Committees are noted in the annual report but not necessarily
annexed, presumably due to restrictions imposed on the length of the
treaty bodies’ reports. Furthermore, although the HRC, for example,
categorises the response of the state with respect to the
implementation of specific recommendations it is not always apparent
on which basis this ‘grade’ is made.
4 Publicity and implementation
Why should the measures taken by states to implement these
decisions and judgments be made public? First, this requirement is
part of the right to truth, not only for the victims in the case but also
for the wider public.19 
In addition, research around why and how states implement
decisions and judgments from human rights treaty bodies and indeed
international legal courts and tribunals identifies a range of factors
with different theories attempting to explain the rationale behind
states’ responses.20 Some argue that if one can ‘generate publicity
about compliance patterns [one can] … raise awareness among
18 See HRC General Comment 33 para17.
19 UN Human Rights Council, Right to Truth, A/HRC/RES/9/11; UN Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, General Comment on the Right to the
Truth in Relation to Enforced Disappearances, A/HRC/16/48. See eg Dino Noca v
Democratic Republic of the Congo Communication 286 2004, para 158; Bekker
(n 4) 499. See also before the European Court, El-Masri v Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia App 39630/09 para 191; UN Human Rights Council, Right to Truth,
A/HRC/RES/9/11. The Aire Centre, Amnesty International, ICJ, OMCT, Redress,
Joint NGO Response to the Standing Committee on the Rules of Court’s Report on
the Treatment of Classified Documents, AI Index: IOR 60/8245/2018, 5 April
2018.
20 F Viljoen & L Louw ‘State compliance with the recommendations of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 American
Journal of International Law 1; F Viljoen & L Louw ‘The status of the findings of the
African Commission: From moral persuasion to legal obligation’ (2004) 44 Journal
of African Law 1; Open Society Justice Initiative (n 2); Open Society Justice
Initiative From judgment to justice. Implementing international and regional human
rights decisions (2010); R Murray & D Long Implementation of the findings of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2015); B Çalı & A Wyss ‘Why do
democracies comply with human rights judgments? A comparative analysis of the
UK, Ireland and Germany, 26 August 2009; D Hawkins & W Jacoby ‘Partial
compliance: A comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights’ (2010) 6 Journal of International Law and International Relations 35 40;
C Hillebrecht ‘Rethinking compliance: The challenges and prospects of measuring
compliance with international human rights tribunals’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human
Rights Practice 368; C Hillebrecht Domestic politics and international human rights
tribunals: The problem of compliance (2014); F Viljoen ‘Exploring the theory and
practice of the relationship between international human rights law and domestic
actors’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 177.
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agencies and … make it easier for the media to follow up on problem
areas’.21 As the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) report made
clear: ‘Improving the visibility, accessibility, and accuracy of
information pertinent to implementation is also essential.’22
The project found that there is a distinction but inter-relationship
here with the awareness of the treaty body issuing the decision,
awareness of the decision itself and the visibility of the measures taken
by the state to implement any of the reparations contained therein.
Thus, there was some evidence from the cases that were examined
that, tied up with the implementation is a lack of awareness of the
treaty bodies: ‘Most government officials don’t know there is an
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Very, very few
people. Even lawyers don’t know there is an African Commission.’23
Consequently, there may be little knowledge among citizens and
lawyers about the existence of these communication procedures and
how they operate,24 and government officials may not have regular
engagement with the African Commission through, for instance,
attendance at its sessions.25 This lack of knowledge may be related to,
or explained by, the level of awareness of human rights generally
within the state:26
The problem of implementation of decisions of international bodies … is
really a symptom of a root cause … the human rights culture in the
country, but also the level of awareness among the citizens, but, possibly
very importantly among the officials.
With respect to the decision itself the project heard in some of the
cases that the amount of publicity determined whether the state
reacted and how quickly, as it could prompt key domestic actors to
ask questions of the executive.27 Conversely, where the decision is not
known this ‘reduces the possibility of intense pressure from citizens.
Popular pressure is missing … I see lack of ownership of these
21 V Gauri, J Staton & JV Cullell ‘A monitoring mechanism for constitutional decisions
on the Costa Rican Supreme Court’ 2012 International Congress of the Latin
American Studies Association (21 May 2012) 5, cited in Open Society Justice
Initiative (n 20) 100. Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc A/51/40
paras 435-438; then in Rules of Procedure 2012, Rule 103.
22 Open Society Justice Initiative (n 20) 29.
23 Interview with civil society representative, Cameroon, March 2017. Round Table
on Factors Influencing the Implementation of Decisions of Human Rights Bodies,
Yaoundé, Cameroon, 5 July 2017 (on file with author).
24 Eg HRLIP Evaluation by Burkina Faso of their implementation of decisions made by
international human rights bodies, Ouagadougou, 27-28 November 2017,
Workshop Report; Interview with government official, 20 March 2018.
25 General Report of the Regional Seminar on the Implementation of Decisions of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 12-15 August 2017, Dakar,
Senegal. F Viljoen & C Odinkalu The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in the
African human rights system: A handbook for victims and their advocates OMCT
Handbook Series Vol 3, OMCT, Geneva, Switzerland, 2014.
26 Interview with civil society representative, Zambia, March 2017. See also General
Report (n 25); Interview A3, December 2017.
27 Eg interview with parliamentarian, Zambia, August 2017.
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decisions … The problem is not because people are not willing but
that they are unaware.’28
States may be more likely to respond if the decision is more visible
and may take a pragmatic approach accordingly. As one government
official acknowledged in the project: ‘It’s about which one gets more
publicity, and so then that determines also how much attention is
given to it … sometimes the speed at which a matter moves is very
dependent on what attention is gotten.’29
Here visibility is relevant not just at the national level but also
regionally and internationally: ‘A country agrees to implement …
international decisions depending on how it sees or views the human
rights at the global level … [the country] must make progress at
continental and global levels in terms of human rights.’30
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the treaty body itself, according to
some, may also be at stake. One rationale for a body such as the
African Commission to publish information on the measures taken by
the state to implement the decision is that it shows that it is doing
something to monitor the situation and, as one litigant said, ‘that
someone is keeping track’.31 Consequently, without such
transparency there is a risk that any decisions that are taken may be
tainted by political interference.32
Without a systematic recording of the measures taken by states to
implement the recommendations of the African Commission one has
a skewed picture of the extent of implementation. As two interviewees
told us: ‘We tend to only hear about cases where the complainant has
not received any compensation’;33 and that ‘states sometimes do
good things but not able to tell us’.34 Furthermore, this situation can
result in ‘rumours’ around what did or did not happen in response to
the decision and lack of concrete evidence.35
While there are strong arguments for information post-decision to
be public a blanket approach may not always be wise. There may be
cogent reasons why some issues should be kept confidential. First, it
may be necessary to protect individuals and their identities,
particularly if the victim has been the subject of criminal proceedings
at the national level. Second, and this argument relates to the fact
that there can be limited knowledge at the national level of the work
of the treaty body, the project heard concerns from one state that if
28 Interview with government official, Burkina Faso, December 2017.
29 Interview Zambia, March 2018. Interview with civil society organisation, Zambia,
March 2017.
30 Interview with civil society organisation, Burkina Faso, December 2017.
31 Interview D11, May 2017.
32 CA Odinkalu ‘The individual complaints procedures of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights: A preliminary assessment’ (1998) 8 Transnational Law
and Contemporary Problems 359 fn 49.
33 Interview with civil society representative, Burkina Faso, July 2017.
34 Interview B2, July 2017.
35 Interview with civil society representative, Burkina Faso, July 2017.
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the public knew, for example, that compensation had been paid to
particular individuals, this would open a ‘Pandora’s box’ for others to
claim, and that some discussions are best dealt with through a
‘process of quiet negotiation’.36
Third, in some circumstances it may engender trust between the
African Commission and the state if it is able to report difficulties to it
in confidence, views echoed by a litigant, as well as a member of the
Commission:37
You want the parties to report to you the challenges they are facing
without feeling like they are exposed to the public. We need the state to be
able to come to you openly and have that protection there. If you get the
feeling that this will be out there and exposed … it is similar to the
amicable settlement procedure.
States also may be reluctant to make the actual decisions public when
compared anecdotally with the recommendations in the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR). As one state representative told us, in part
because of the language involved, the audience to whom it is
directed, and the apparent discretion the state has in terms of how it
addresses the recommendation:38
The state decides whether to accept recommendations and so tries to
inform the entire international community on the decision. Individual
communications always have words condemning states. The UPR
procedure is much more diplomatic and encouraging and facilitating, as
compared with individual communications. So it incentivises the state and
raises awareness of other people in informing them what is being done.
In conclusion, this finding does not lead us to suggest that
confidentiality should apply to all such instances, but what it does
point to is a need for greater clarity on when and what should be
made public.
5 Relevant elements of the process
There are a number of different elements of the communication
procedure post-decision that need to be considered.
5.1 Provisional measures
The African Commission can issue provisional measures according to
Rule 98 of its 2010 Rules of Procedure (and former Rule 111 of its
1995 Rules) and has done so in a number of cases.39 A
36 Interview C1, March 2017.
37 Interview D8, May 2017; interview D2, April 2017.
38 Interview, February 2018. See also Round Table on Factors Influencing the
Implementation of Decisions of Human Rights Bodies, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 5 July
2017 (on file with author).
39 For a discussion, see CB Herrera & F Viljoen ‘Danger and fear in prison. Protecting
the most vulnerable persons in Africa and the Americas by regional human rights
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communication must be pending before the Commission before it will
consider provisional measures.40 The challenge arises in that if the
communication is pending, any issue relating to it, including
provisional measures, then, according to the African Commission, will
be considered confidential. In fact, on no occasion have provisional
measures adopted by the Commission been made public. All that is
available is a brief mention in the activity report of the Commission
citing the name of the case41 and, again usually in passing, reference
in the decision on the communication that provisional measures were
requested and accepted or rejected by the African Commission.42
There is no separate ‘decision’, and it is not clear if the Commission’s
conclusions on granting provisional measures are a separate ‘order’
(as it has referred to it in some communications)43 or merely a
procedural element of the communication mechanisms in the same
way as, say, seizure.
Rule 98 refers to the provisional measures being a ‘request’ taken
by the African Commission (or the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson if
the Commission is not in session).44 This request is sent to the state
party and then only is it forwarded to the victim, the Assembly, Peace
and Security Council (PSC) and the AU Commission.45 In this regard,
therefore, it does not appear to warrant authorisation by the
Assembly, in contrast to a final decision on the merits under article 55
of the African Charter. Yet, this possibility could contradict article
59(1) which provides that ‘[a]ll measures taken within the provisions
of the present Chapter shall remain confidential until the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide’, the Chapter
being articles 46-59, but not article 45. The reference to ‘all measures’
seems unequivocal. Yet, while the African Commission has called on
parties not to disseminate information, in practice it is not clear how
consistently it has done so and there is evidence that this request has
been disregarded.46 The result of this confused state of affairs, as
Herrera and Viljoen note, is that ‘[i]t is virtually impossible to establish
exactly how many [provisional measures] have been adopted by the
ACHPR and whether the state concerned complied with the
request’.47 Under its Rule 118(2), the African Commission can refer to
40 bodies through interim measures’ (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human
Rights 163.
40 ‘At any time after the receipt of a Communication and before a determination on
the merits’, Rule 98(1), Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, 2010.
41 Eg, 44th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
para 21.
42 Herrera & Viljoen (n 39) 170-171.
43 Eg, Ahmed Ismael & 528 Others v the Arab Republic of Egypt Communication 467/
14, 27 May 2016; The Indigenous Peoples of the Lower Omo (represented by Survival
International Charitable Trust) v Ethiopia Communication 419/12, 35th Activity
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights para 27.
44 Rule 98(2), Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, 2010.
45 Rule 98(3), Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, 2010.
46 Information on file with author.
47 Herrera & Viljoen (n 39) 191.
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the African Court any communication where a request for provisional
measures has not been complied with.
Before the African Court the order on provisional measures is made
public.48
5.2 Proceedings to determine reparations and the reasoning in 
the decision
Before the African Commission there is no separate procedure, written
or oral, to determine the recommendations or reparations that the
Commission makes in the finding of a violation. Instead, these issues
are dealt with as part of the written submissions in the
communication and in any hearings, both of which are governed by
article 59 and, therefore, confidential.49 Before the African Court,
while the pleadings when the case is pending before the Court are
confidential,50 the Court’s Rules enable additional submissions on
reparations, post-judgment, and the issuing of a separate ruling on
reparations.51 While the pleadings in this second process, on the
reparations, also are private, the ruling itself will be public.
Furthermore, in part because before the African Commission
reparations are dealt with in the merits, the reasoning provided in the
decision on how the Commission reached its recommendations often
is limited if not absent. This practice is not without consequence
because, as the project found for one state, it can impact on the
legitimacy of the Commission and how it is perceived.52
5.3 Publication and visibility of the actual decision
The decision on the communication, which includes recommen-
dations that the state has to implement to remedy the violations, is
adopted by the African Commission at one of its sessions. It is then
submitted to the AU organs in accordance with article 59 and, usually,
approved.53 It is only after its publication has been authorised by the
AU Assembly at its Summit that the decision on the communication
becomes public.54 
48 Eg App 016/2017, Dexter Eddie Johnson v Republic of Ghana, Order for Provisional
Measures, 28 September 2017.
49 Rule 110(2), (3) and (4) (decision on the merits): ‘The Commission shall deliberate
on Communications in private, and all aspects of the discussions shall be
confidential.’
50 Interview D5, May 2017.
51 Eg App 004/2013, Lohe Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso, Judgment on the merits,
5 December 2014; Ruling on Reparations, 3 June 2016.
52 Eg Interview B7, 28 February 2018.
53 However, see for instances where this has not occurred, Decision on the Activity
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), EX CL/
Dec310 (IX); F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2007) 199;
R Murray Commentary on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2019)
ch 36.
54 See eg Decision on the 44th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, EX CL/Dec 1014 (XXXIII) para 1.
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The broad applicability of article 59 to the whole communication
procedure has been critiqued.55 This situation is not helped by the
fact that the some versions of the African Charter, including the
version for some time published on the website of the African
Commission itself, stated under article 59 that ‘[a]ll measures taken
within the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential
until the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise
decide’, with ‘Charter’ being inserted instead of ‘Chapter’. This
confusion may explain, in part, the very limiting interpretation of the
scope of article 59 by the African Commission.
Prior to the adoption of the decision, the applicability of article 59
is strict. This ruling is buttressed by the Rules of Procedure of the
African Commission. Rule 18(d) requires that its Secretary will ‘ensure
confidentiality of the Commission’s records where appropriate’, and
the staff similarly have obligations to ‘observe the principle of
confidentiality in all matters that the Commission considers
confidential as stipulated under the Charter and these Rules’.56
Communications are discussed in private sessions and Rule 31 notes
that ‘deliberations shall remain confidential’, with the Commission
ensuring the ‘confidentiality of all case files, including pleadings’.57
Although the Chairperson of the Commission ‘may communicate to
the public general information on deliberations in private sessions’,
this possibility is ‘subject to the exigencies of article 59 of the Charter
and any special directions by the Commission’. In practice it has
meant that the only information revealed while a communication is
pending in the Commission’s activity report is the name and number
of the communication and at what stage it is at in the Commission’s
deliberations.58 Consequently, pleadings and submissions by the
parties on pending communications are considered confidential, and
the African Commission has called on parties not to publish their
submissions on their websites.59
Rules 110(2), (3) and (4) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure provide
that the decision will remain confidential even after having been
signed by the Chairperson and Secretary of the African Commission
and will be transmitted to the parties only once the Assembly has
authorised its publication. The Rules also require the African
Commission to then post the decision on its website.60 
55 Eg Killander (n 1) 572.
56 Rule 22 African Commission Rules of Procedure.
57 Rules 31(1) and (3) respectively, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission
2010.
58 Eg 44th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Submitted in Accordance with Article 54 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, November 2017-May 2018 para 21.
59 Information on file with author.
60 See also Rule 18(i) (functions of the secretary): ‘Make available to the general
public documents which are not confidential, including states reports, by ensuring
that they are posted on the website of the Commission.’
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The first matter relevant to the implementation of the decision is
the extent to which the decision itself is visible and publicised. Once
the decision is made public, it may not be visible and may reach few
people beyond the actual parties to the communication, a situation
acknowledged by the African Commission itself.61 While the African
Court specifically has required the state to place a summary of the
judgment in its official Gazette, a ‘widely-read’ national daily
newspaper and on the official website for one year,62 the African
Commission has not adopted a similar approach. Consequently, and
in light of the lack of awareness of the work of the Commission
generally at the national level, in the states involved in the project
certainly, the decision easily can disappear from sight.
The requirement that it is only the parties with whom the African
Commission will communicate while the matter is pending before it
spills out beyond the decision itself. While the Commission places the
decision on its website, the presumption appears to be that those
wishing for more information, such as national human rights
institutions or civil society organisations in the state, are encouraged
to approach the Commission, rather than the Commission having an
obligation to disseminate the decision itself. As noted in the report of
the Working Group on Communications, ‘[o]nce the Activity Report of
the Commission has been authorised for publication by the AU policy
organs, the general public can have access to the text of the decisions
referenced in that report’.63
The practical difficulty is how the ‘general public’ can get access to
such texts or even are aware of their existence. This is exacerbated by
the fact that the website of the African Commission is not always
updated, links are broken, and decisions, even after their adoption,
can disappear from the site if they were ever put there in the first
place.
Consequently, even though there is no question over the extent to
which the decision itself should be published, in reality publication
does not equate with visibility.
While national stakeholders, including parliament, may be waiting
for the state authorities to share information with them, the project
was also informed that the executive may not see it as within its role
to do so, nor did they see the need to inform others outside of
government. As one ministry official from Cameroon told us, ‘it is not
our authority to inform the public … [we] inform the people with the
… objective to implement the decision. It is not for us to inform
61 See General Report (n 25) para 23.
62 See eg Lohe Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso App 004/2013, Judgment on Reparations,
3 June 2016 para 60(viii).
63 Report of the Chairperson of the Working Group on Communications, by
Commissioner Lucy Asuagbor, presented during the 56th ordinary session of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Banjul, The Gambia, 21 April-
7 May 2015 para 15.
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people or parliament.’64 Consequently, perhaps the communication is
seen simply to ‘focus on people involved in order to resolve the
problem’ rather than seeing it as information for others, ‘the
communication is not talking to the entire population but to the
people concerned’.65
5.4 Process within the state determining how the 
recommendations are to be implemented
The implementation of decisions will require a range of different
procedures and processes to be initiated, through executive
departments, the courts or parliament. Whether the state has
appointed a particular ministry or department to coordinate the
implementation varies from state to state and from decision to
decision. In the three countries in Africa involved in the project, for
instance, one had an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate the
government response (Cameroon), the others had ad hoc mechanisms
(Burkina Faso and Zambia) and all three countries required additional
procedures to be followed to ensure the implementation of specific
aspects of the recommendations. The state may also need to discuss
the technicalities of implementation with the African Commission
itself, although in the cases the project examined this possibility does
not appear to have been utilised.
There will inevitably be a need for the government to discuss
internally how it will coordinate and manage this process of
implementation. Depending on where this takes place, the extent to
which these discussions are, and should be, transparent is important
to consider. In Cameroon, discussions on implementation take place
in the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Monitoring the Implementation
of Recommendations and/or Decisions Arising from International and
Regional Mechanisms for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and, while the Committee has a broad composition, it meets
erratically and its findings are not made public.66
5.5 Assessment by the African Commission of the measures taken 
by the state
Rule 112 provides for the procedure on ‘follow-up on the
recommendations of the Commission’ and reads:
(1) After the consideration of the Commission’s Activity Report by the
Assembly, the Secretary shall notify the parties within thirty (30) days
that they may disseminate the decision.
64 Round Table on Factors Influencing the Implementation of Decisions of Human
Rights Bodies, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 5 July 2017 (on file with author).
65 As above.
66 As above. See also interview B5, 26 February 2018; interview B8, 28 February
2018.
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(2) In the event of a decision against a state party, the parties shall inform
the Commission in writing, within one hundred and eighty (180)
days of being informed of the decision in accordance with paragraph
one, of all measures, if any, taken or being taken by the state party to
implement the decision of the Commission.
(3) Within ninety (90) days of receipt of the state’s written response, the
Commission may invite the state concerned to submit further
information on the measures it has taken in response to its decision.
(4) If no response is received from the state, the Commission may send a
reminder to the state party concerned to submit its information
within ninety (90) days from the date of the reminder.
(5) The Rapporteur for the communication, or any other member of the
Commission designated for this purpose, shall monitor the measures
taken by the state party to give effect to the Commission’s
recommendations on each communication.
(6) The Rapporteur may make such contacts and take such action as may
be appropriate to fulfil his/her assignment including recommen-
dations for further action by the Commission as may be necessary.
(7) At each ordinary session, the Rapporteur shall present the report
during the public session on the implementation of the Commission’s
recommendations.
(8) The Commission shall draw the attention of the Sub-Committee of
the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Executive Council
on the Implementation of the Decisions of the African Union, to any
situations of non-compliance with the Commission’s decisions.
(9) The Commission shall include information on any follow-up activities
in its Activity Report.
There are various tools that the African Commission has used to
collate information on the measures taken by the state to implement
its decisions. One needs to consider what aspects of this procedure
should be and, indeed, currently are public.
5.5.1 Information provided by the parties and others on the measures 
taken by the state to implement the decision
The project attempted to find what measures the states had taken to
implement the decisions. There were challenges in doing so as, in the
three African states there is no one place where this information is
provided at the national level, nor does the African Commission show
this information in an easily-accessible location. Rather, one has to
look across statements made by the state representatives at the
Commission sessions and reference to these cases and measures in
documents adopted by the Commission, including its Concluding
Observations or any resolutions it adopted.
The project found that there are a number of reasons why there is a
need for the information on the measures taken to implement the
decision to be made public. First, this may be one way or indeed the
CONFIDENTIALITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS OF AFRICAN COMMISSION     17
only way in which the litigants learn what the state has done.67
Additionally, in the interests of justice one would presume that the
victims themselves, at the very least, should know what action the
state has taken to address their violations. Without a clear policy on
what is confidential and what is not, the project found that sometimes
even the victims and complainants themselves were not aware of the
information that the state had shared with the treaty body, for
instance: ‘We usually would get copies of any correspondence that
was sent, but we have never received anything from the state that
said “Listen, here we are. Here’s the new law – look, it’s fine” or
anything of the sort.’68
Making public the measures (or lack of measures) taken by states to
implement decisions and judgments can mean that examples of good
as well as bad practices among states can be identified, and credit can
be given to states that have implemented reparations. Moreover,
more visibility can enable the accuracy of any information submitted
to the supervisory bodies on the measures taken by the state to be
verified. If the supervisory body has only one source of information,
whether that be from the state itself or from the complainant, it may
not be in a position to determine whether that information indeed is
reliable. Making those claims public could enable others to come
forward with further evidence.
Thus, visibility is another tool to facilitate state accountability,
particularly if the information emanating from any national
mechanism is not available. As one civil society representative told us
in relation to Cameroon, ‘the follow up mechanism is the inter-
ministerial committee but it is difficult to track, it sits within the PM
office and made of many ministries’.69
Visibility then enhances the capacity of the complainant to bring
further awareness to the level of implementation: ‘The complainant
plays a very big role in making the noise about their issue, and then a
bit of attention is given to it.’70
Hence, if one accepts that there should be visibility of the action
taken by the state to implement the decision, then it becomes
important to determine how the African Commission makes such
information public. At the moment its approach is ad hoc, making
incidental references in resolutions, the state reporting procedure and
in its activity reports.71 There is a strong argument for the African
Commission to maintain a database on its website that will display the
67 Eg interview D11, May 2017.
68 As above.
69 Round Table on Factors Influencing the Implementation of Decisions of Human
Rights Bodies, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 5 July 2017 (on file with author).
70 Interview with government official, March 2018.
71 See below.
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actions taken by the state as against each of the recommendations in
the communication.72 However, this demand will require that it has a
process and system by which it is able to seek information from
various sources beyond the parties to the case, to test its accuracy and
to cross-check it against other sources, before making this available on
any public-facing database.
Indeed, the project has evidence that the African Commission holds
considerably more information on the measures taken by the state to
implement the decision, but this has not been made available as a
matter of course to those outside the Commission.73
5.5.2 African Commission’s monitoring process
The African Commission does not have a process, as such, to monitor
the implementation of its decisions. Rather, beyond sending letters to
the parties asking for information on any measures taken it utilises its
other procedures to seek information.
The African Commission sometimes asks questions of the state
during the article 62 state-reporting process on the measures taken to
implement decisions. These questions may be posed in public during
that part of the session of the Commission and the state may or may
not respond to them at the time, with the manner in which the oral
examination takes place enabling them to evade answering certain
questions. Consistency and regular contact between the African
Commission Rapporteur for the state report and domestic civil society
organisations and the national human rights institution could facilitate
the asking of more pointed questions during the oral examination.
Written responses from the state almost never are made public and
while the Concluding Observations adopted by the African
Commission are public and increasingly detailed, including some
examples where the implementation of decisions have been raised,
they are not consistently available on the Commission’s website. The
few examples of references to implementation of decisions are ad hoc
and brief. A low-resource approach that would maximise the potential
for the state-reporting process to assist here is to require that
Concluding Observations have a standard paragraph that requires the
state to report back on the implementation of decisions. 
In addition to state reporting, a handful of resolutions adopted by
the African Commission in relation to particular states have identified
the measures taken or failed to have been taken by the authorities in
implementing a decision. There are only a small number of instances
where resolutions refer to the implementation of decisions, for
example, in relation to Gunme & Others v Cameroon,74 where its
72 This was also a recommendation in Dakar: General Report (n 25): ‘Develop a
database with periodic updates on the status of implementation of decisions by
states.’
73 Interview D1, 20 April 2017.
74 AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009).
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resolution in 2018 noted ongoing concerns with the situation in the
country.75 Thus, it is not clear on what basis the Commission will
adopt a resolution urging the implementation of a case and why it has
done so for these and not for others.
Depending on the timing, the African Commission and its special
mechanisms have highlighted specific decisions during their missions
to states and referred to evidence obtained in relation to their
implementation in subsequent reports.76 These reports are not always
provided on the Commission’s website although it is not clear if this is
because they are intended to be confidential or because of a lack of
resources at the Secretariat to ensure an up-to-date and
comprehensive website.
The African Commission has held hearings on communications, but
on two occasions only has it held hearings to examine implemen-
tation, one in relation to the Endorois case against Kenya77 and one
for communications against Mauritania.78 They clearly are the
exception rather than the rule. Rule 25(2) of the Commission’s Rules
of Procedure provides that ‘[s]essions of the Commission shall be held
in public unless the Commission decides otherwise or if it appears
from the relevant provisions of the Charter that the meeting shall be
held in private’.
One may argue that hearings on implementation no longer fall
under article 59 as the decision has been authorised by the Assembly
and made public. Yet, in practical terms, those who are likely to be
aware that the hearing will take place principally are the parties.
Communications are slated to be discussed during the private
sessions, and one would presume that any hearings on
implementation by default would happen then as well. 
In addition, there is no clear policy on how the hearings should be
run. As one person involved in one of the two hearings that had been
held told us, ‘the hearings … are sort of well, appear to be
confidential, don’t they? Although that’s not I guess, clear, ‘cause
75 Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Republic of Cameroon, ACHPR/
Res 395 (LXII), 9 May 2018. See also, in general, press release on the human
rights situation in Cameroon, 29 January 2018, although this does not explicitly
reference the decision. See also Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to
Implement the Endorois Decision, ACHPR/Res.257, 5 November 2013; see also
Resolution on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the Context of the
World Heritage Convention and the Designation of Lake Bogoria as a World
Heritage site, ACHPR/Res 197, 5 November 2011.
76 Eg listed among the ‘positive developments’ was Cameroon’s implementation of
Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & Another v Cameroon (2009) AHRLR
47 (ACHPR 2009) by payment of compensation.
77 See R Martin ‘“The Endorois decision” – Four years on, the Endorois still await
action by the government of Kenya’, https://minorityrights.org/2014/09/23/the-
endorois-decision-four-years-on-the-endorois-still-await-action-by-the-government
-of-kenya/ (accessed 23 September 2014).
78 See LM Bingham & J Harrington ‘Never-ending story: The African Commission
evolving through practice in Malawi Africa Association et al v Mauritania’ (2013) 1
Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 7.
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there’s no rules, procedure that cover it.’79 Consequently, the
approach was described to us as ‘chaotic’.80 The decision to hold
them in private appears to be by default rather than design.
If the hearings are to be public, the question then arises of when
they would be held. The discussion of communications takes place in
the private sessions of the African Commission, in the second half of
the session and, consequently, when many other state delegates,
national human rights institutions and civil society organisations have
left.81 Although in theory there is no reason why the African
Commission could not hold such hearings in public and during its
sessions, this will require a change from the normal practice. Holding
the hearings during extraordinary sessions that have so far taken a
more ad hoc approach to when matters will be public or private may
also be a possibility, as may having them separate to the session (or
even in the state to which they relate), although to do this inevitably
would require additional resources.82 Lessons could be learnt from the
practice of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Committee).83
Hence, consideration needs to be given to the role of the hearing
and whether it also is an attempt to come to a settlement (‘Let them
meet face to face publicly. Try to at least to discussion in the open
outstanding issues that really have not been settled’);84 to assist in the
clarification of what steps the state should take to implement the
decision; and/or to obtain information from the parties on what
measures have been taken. A decision impacts on who should attend,
how it should be organised and where. If, for instance, it is to
promote the decision, then holding any hearing in private will not
facilitate the involvement of national stakeholders. The experiences of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which can hold
working groups in private, hearings in public, and thematic hearings
dealing with implementation, could provide a useful model on which
the African Commission could draw.85
5.5.3 Criteria to measure implementation
The African Commission, one presumes in line with its requirement to
report on such to the Commission’s session and to the AU’s
Permanent Representatives Committee and Executive Council in Rules
112(7) and (8), will need to make some assessment also whether the
79 Interview D1, April 2017.
80 As above.
81 Eg interview D2, April 2017.
82 As above.
83 See eg https://www.chr.up.ac.za/news-archive/505-centre-for-human-rights-takes-
part-in-african-children-s-rights-committee-hearing-on-implementation (accessed
1 April 2019).
84 Interview D1, April 2017.
85 V Kristicevic ‘A strategy for improving the level of implementation of judgments in
the Inter-American system’ (2010) 16 Interights Bulletin 92-93.
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state has satisfactorily implemented the recommendations in the
decision. In order to do so, it must first obtain the information on
what the state has actually done. It then must determine the criteria
for how it measures implementation86 which is not a straightforward
process.87 On the one hand, determining if an individual has been
released from custody, for instance, could appear to be easily fulfilled.
However, on the other, if no time frame is given in the decision as to
when the individual should be released and the state authorities take
time to do so, when will the African Commission consider that it has
or has not been satisfactorily implemented? If the recommendations
are vague (‘comply with its international obligations’), the assessment,
in itself, may require the clarification of certain benchmarks. Complex
political situations and guarantees of non-repetition raise different
challenges. For instance, how precisely does the African Commission
evaluate when the Cameroonian government has ‘stop[ped] the
transfer of accused persons from the Anglophone provinces for trial in
the Francophone provinces’?88
The process and criteria, if it has any, by which the African
Commission determines state implementation is not yet apparent. At
present there is evidence from the project that even if the state has
submitted information it is not clear what the Commission thinks
about this. As one litigant told us: ‘We submitted a dossier of one
thousand pages. Interestingly enough that particular file was lost …
we try our best to make all that information available … you don’t get
any feedback … Nothing.’89
Without an indication from the Commission that it has taken these
submissions into account in some way there is a risk that further
information will not be sent by the parties. As litigants informed us:
‘We keep reminding the state, reminding the Commission, but we are
leaning to think, of course, that it is a waste of time.’ As a result it is
reported: ‘I don’t see them doing a lot, to be honest, on
implementation’, and ‘It never really [followed up on deadlines] and
then it never really follows up properly.’ 
5.5.4 Working Group on Communications’ report on implementation 
and the African Commission’s activity report
The Working Group on Communications having been given the
mandate to monitor the implementation of decisions,90 now issues a
86 D Hawkins & W Jacoby ‘Partial compliance: A comparison of the European and
Inter-American Courts for Human Rights’ (2010) 6 Journal of International Law and
International Relations 35.
87 D Long & A-K Speck ‘Measuring implementation’ (2019) Journal of Human Rights
Practice Special Issue (forthcoming).
88 Gunme (n 74) para 215(2).
89 Interview April 2017.
90 Resolution on the Mandate of the Working Group on Communications of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ACHPR/Res 212, 1 March
2012.
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report at every session that can provide a list of cases and provides
some brief detail on the status of implementation. For instance, while
the report to the 60th session of the African Commission noted some
‘constructive dialogue’ between the parties and the Commission
around the implementation of Communication 318/06 and that there
had ‘not been a debut of implementation’ with respect to four cases,
this was all that was provided.91 In addition, the African Commission’s
activity report now includes the odd sentence or two on actions
regarding some communications and provisional measures.92
This practice is not comparable to the detail provided by the Inter-
American system nor, albeit to a lesser extent, by the African Court. It
is not at all clear whether the AU, when the African Commission
reports to it, receives any more information than that which is
provided at the sessions.
5.6 Referral to the African Court
Rule 118(1) of the African Commission’s Rules of Procedure enables
the Commission if it ‘considers that the state has not complied or is
unwilling to comply with its recommendations’ to submit the
communication to the African Court. If the African Commission is to
do so, it will have had to gather information on the measures to
implement taken by the state. Litigants have been making requests for
such referrals. The African Commission, unlike the Inter-American
Commission,93 has not made public any detailed criteria it applies
when determining which cases to refer to the Court. So far it has
referred only three cases, and none of them on the basis of article
118(1). Conversely, because the process for decision on referral is an
internal matter of the African Commission, no detail can be gleaned
from the African Court’s subsequent judgment as to why the case was
referred.94
91 Inter-Session Activity Report (November 2016-May 2017) of Hon Commissioner
Lucy Asuagbor, Chairperson of the Working Group on Communications,
presented at the 60th ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, Niamey, Niger, 8-22 May 2017 paras 29-30.
92 Eg 35th Activity Report of the African Commission, reference to Egyptian Initiative
for Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt II (2011) AHRLR 90 (ACHPR 2011), to
‘follow-up on implementation’, 27; see also para 27: ‘With regards to 419/12, The
Indigenous Peoples of the Lower Omo (Represented by Survival International
Charitable Trust) v Ethiopia, the Commission issued an order against the state,
requesting the latter to adopt provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm
being caused to the victim of alleged human rights violations; the state has not
respected that order.’
93 See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Approved by the Commission at its 137th regular period of sessions, held from 28
October to 13 November 2009, and modified on 2 September 2011 and during
the 147th Regular Period of Sessions, held from 8-22 March 2013, for entry into
force on 1 August 2013, art 45.
94 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya,
App 6/2012, Judgment of 27 May 2017 para 53 and paras 58-61.
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Furthermore, the pleadings and submissions to the African Court
(although not the hearings) are covered by principles of
confidentiality95 and, therefore, despite it being the culmination of a
decision by the African Commission, the case then enters into a
further closed procedure whereby information on any measures taken
by the state is hidden from public view until any hearing and
subsequent judgment by the Court.
5.7 Requests by the state for technical assistance on how to 
interpret the judgment or decision
There is some merit in the argument by some states that they were
not clear on what precisely they were meant to do to implement the
decision. For example, a generic ‘take the necessary measures to bring
in line with the African Charter and international human rights law’
arguably is more nebulous than, say, the more specific
recommendation that an individual victim is paid a certain amount of
compensation. Leaving aside valid comments that a state with the
necessary good-will certainly may find the appropriate manner in
which to respond to the vaguest of recommendations, the question
arises as to whether any requests from the state to the treaty body for
further clarity and assistance in interpreting the decision themselves
should be made public. The African Commission has not published
any policy on what its response would be to such requests but the
project found that there was a willingness, in some instances but not
necessarily all, to engage with states post-decision to assist them in
clarifying what action they should take to implement the decision.96
However, the extent to which states have made such requests to
the African Commission is not evident. The project noted, through
additional judgments of the African Court, that states have asked this
judicial body for clarification on how to implement its judgments and
reparations.97 While the trend is towards greater specificity in the
recommendations and, therefore, the need may become less, the
project found that states often say they want to be able to maintain a
relationship with the African Commission to enable them to discuss
what action they need to adopt to implement the decision.
Again, there may be cogent reasons why the discussion around the
measures to be taken by the state should remain confidential. For
example, the issue may be one of particular political sensitivity and it
may enable a more open discussion if this is done out of the glare of
the media. For instance, the Department of Execution of the
Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe’s discussions with the
95 Rules of Court, Rules 60(1) and 61(1). Re hearings, see Rule 43; art 10 of the
Protocol.
96 Eg interview D13, 23 November 2017; interview D4, 27 June 2017. Rule 111 of
the African Commission’s 2010 Rules of Procedure deals with reviews of decisions
on the merits.
97 See eg App 1/2017 – Interpretation of Judgment of 20 November 2015 – Alex
Thomas v United Republic of Tanzania, Judgment, 28 September 2017.
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state are not public. Although a state’s action plan is published, the
meetings with the state exclude civil society organisations as well as
the applicants.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
At present the African Commission has slipped into presuming that
measures taken by the state to implement recommendations, the
evidence presented by the complainants (or indeed other actors) on
the extent to which it has done so and the Commission’s own
assessment fall within the communication procedure and, therefore,
by default are confidential. Yet, article 59 neither requires this nor do
the Rules of Procedure, and a blanket approach to confidentiality
post-decision is not appropriate.
The publication and dissemination of the decision itself over which
there can be no doubt, as the 2017 Dakar Seminar of the African
Commission reiterated,98 can be assisted with a few, low or no-cost,
tactics. The Commission’s website should be kept up to date and the
Commission could draw on the African Court’s approach, namely, to
include as a standard paragraph in each of its decisions the
requirements that the state publish the decision in a national paper,
on social media and maintain it there for a particular period of time
and publish, certainly at the national level, the procedures and those
responsible for implementing the decision, and the measures it has
taken to implement the decision and to share these specifically with
the victims.
There may be some merit in discussions on technical assistance,
however these are achieved, being kept confidential, but the
outcomes (as with action plans adopted by states in respect of
implementation of European Court of Human Rights judgments)
should be made public. Regardless of the approach taken it is crucial
that the African Commission set out criteria on when it will hold
hearings, adopt resolutions or refer the matter to the African Court.
These criteria also should be made public if the Commission is to
avoid the criticism of being perceived as doing nothing or taking an
inconsistent or potentially biased approach.
The African Commission, unless it is not in the interests of the
victim to do so, should make public any information it receives from
the state as to the measures taken to implement the reparations. The
Commission does not appear to have any clear benchmarks that
assess whether implementation is satisfactory or not, made more
challenging by the ambiguity of some of its recommendations. Hence,
making any appraisal of the state’s actions is complicated. Yet, what
the Commission can do is simply publish the information it has
received from the parties without making any assessment as to
98 General Report (n 25), recommendations to the African Commission.
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whether state measures are satisfactory or not. This information could
be provided on its website under the activities of the Working Group
on Communications and in its activity reports, in practice akin to the
approach of the African Court.
The recommendations in this article are not to imply that any
action taken by the African Commission will be sufficient to ensure the
visibility of its decisions and the measures taken to implement them,
neither should they detract from the principal responsibility of the
state authorities to make the decisions available at the national level
and ultimately implement the reparations contained therein.
However, at the very least these actions by the African Commission
could heighten awareness of its decisions, indicate that the
Commission has not lost interest in what states are doing in response
to them, thereby ultimately increasing the likelihood that victims will
receive justice.
